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THE LANDSCAPE OF ARMED GROUPS IN THE EASTERN CONGO
Two years ago, Congolese armed forces celebrated a historic victory against the M23 rebellion, raising hopes that the cycle 
of violence in the eastern Congo was petering out. Today, however, disappointment has set it. At least seventy armed groups 
are active in the eastern Congo, and approximately 1,6 million people remain displaced. The various approaches taken by the 
&ongolese goYernment and its foreign partnersȂȂincluding tKe stabilization program, demobilization e΍orts, and securit\ sector 
reform––have produced meager results.
:Ko are tKese armed groups" 7Ke &ongo 5esearcK *roup Kas mapped around seYent\ armed groups and tKeir areas of inȵuence 
in 1ortK and 6outK .iYu, draZing on original ȴeld researcK for earlier maps on ZKicK tKis e[ercise is based, see here). Most of 
these groups are small, not numbering more than 200 soldiers, and recruit largely along ethnic lines. This short essay outlines 
some of tKe main trends Ze can obserYe in tKe conȵict in recent \ears
THE DECLINE OF THE REGIONAL
7Ke demise of tKe 0 marNed a Kistoric loZ of regional interference in tKe eastern &ongo )or tKe ȴrst time since , tKe 
Rwandan government does not have a serious ally in this region. Even if Rwanda wanted to mobilize again, it would not be easy: 
Congolese Tutsi and Hutu occupy prominent positions in the Forces armées de la République Démocratique du Congo )$5'& but 
many of them harbor deep resentment against their erstwhile allies in Kigali. The few rwandophone belligerents that remain, like 
the various Nyatura and the Nyamusharaba groups, are either small in size, not very active, or in opposition to Rwanda.
7Kis decline in tKe regional dimension of tKe conȵict can also be perceiYed in tKe rKetoric of some of tKe remaining armed groups 
:Kile anti7utsi and anti5Zandan sentiment used to ȴgure among tKeir main Mustiȴcations, tKe goYernment in .insKasa Kas 
become the main object of their invective. 
'espite tKese deYelopments, tKe strongest and most disruptiYe armed groups in tKe eastern &ongo include foreign ones Ζn 
post-M23 eastern Congo, the Rwandan Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda )'/5 is b\ far tKe largest armed group, botK 
in terms of numbers as Zell as geograpKic spread 7Ke )'/5 maintains Yar\ing degrees of inȵuenceȂȂeitKer alone or togetKer 
ZitK tKe arm\, otKer militias, or state administrationȂȂin considerable parts of :aliNale, /ubero, 5utsKuru, 0asisi 1ortK .iYu, 
0Zenga, 8Yira, and )izi territories 6outK .iYu :Kile tKere are contradictor\ claims regarding tKe groupȇs strengtK, it probabl\ 
numbers betZeen , and , troops, seYeral times larger tKan an\ otKer armed group in tKe area  Ζt is, KoZeYer, important 
to KigKligKt tKat tKe group Kas been unable to launcK an\ maMor raids into 5Zanda since  Ζts importance ZitK regards to 
Rwanda is therefore more as a symbolic threat, as many of their leaders were members of the Rwandan army that helped organize 
tKe genocide in  
%esides tKe )'/5, tZo otKer foreign armed groups continue to operate in tKe .iYus tKe 8gandan $llied 'emocratic )orces $') 
and the Nzabampema wing of the Burundian Forces nationales de libération )1/ %otK groups are small, tKe former no more tKan 
 troops and tKe latter probabl\ Kalf tKat size, but remain important 7Ke $') Kas been a Ne\ pla\er in a series of massacres 
around the town of Beni, arguably the worst violence the country has seen in a decade. Here, too, however, it is important to 
highlight that the group, whose commander Jamil Mukulu was arrested this year, has largely given up on its ambition to overthrow 
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the Ugandan government and has become deeply embedded in local dynamics, making it somewhat misleading to highlight its 
foreign nature. 
6imilarl\, 1zabampemaȇs )1/ Zere a marginal group until earl\ tKis \ear, inYolYed in cattle rustling and crossborder raids from 
tKeir base in tKe 5usizi 3lain +oZeYerȂȂand tKis is ZKere tKis regional trend could be reYersedȂȂtKe recent escalation in conȵict 
in %urundi Kas seen tKe remobilization of man\ e[)1/ combatants in tKe proYince of %uMumbura 5ural, raising tKe possibilit\ of 
an intensiȴcation of crossborder troubles, altKougK probabl\ tKrougK otKer, still incKoate groups 
THE CLUSTERING OF CONFLICT
As the map shows, armed groups are scattered throughout the Kivutian highlands, but are much less present in the sparsely 
populated loZlands to tKe ZestȂȂlarge parts of 0Zenga and 6Kabunda are e[amples of tKis 0ost of tKe ȴgKting is clustered in 
otKer areas ZKere a Yariet\ of armed groups are opposed to eacK otKer, or ZKere tKe )$5'& conducts militar\ operations 6eYeral 
sucK Kot spots can be identiȴed 
ȏ 7Ke border betZeen :aliNale and 0asisi territories 1ine di΍erent armed groups are clustered in tKis area, ZKicK Kas also Kas 
been tKe focus of recent )$5'& 6uNola ΖΖ operations against botK tKe )'/5 and tKe $lliance des patriotes pour un Congo libre et 
souverain $3&/6, but is also tKe scene of ȴgKting ZitKin tKe 1duma 'efense of &ongo 1'& armed group tZo Zings, led b\ 
&ommanders *uidon and 6KeNa, KaYe clasKed repeatedl\, as Zell as betZeen tKe 1'& and tKe $3/&6, and tKe 1'& and tKe 
)'/5, and a feZ smaller militias cr\stallizing around tKese cleaYages 
ȏ 7Ke 5usizi 3lain 7Kis is tKe area ZitK tKe KigKest densit\ of armed groups in tKe &ongoȂȂZe could count ȴfteen, including 
groups based in tKe 0o\en 3lateau oYerlooNing tKe plains &onȵicts Kere inYolYe Kistorical disputes betZeen tKe 5undi, 
Banyamulenge, and Fuliiro communities––as well as within these communities––over land and power that have drawn in and 
been instrumentalized b\ political elites in 8Yira and %uNaYu
ȏ )$5'& o΍ensiYes 7Ke Zorst displacement in tKe .iYus t\picall\ occurs in areas ZKere tKe national arm\ conducts 
counterinsurgenc\ operations 7Kis is currentl\ tKe case in tKe footKills of tKe 5uZenzori mountains east of %eni 2peration 
6uNola Ζ, as Zell as in tKe border of 0asisi, :aliNale, and 5utsKuru territories 2peration 6uNola ΖΖ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FRAGMENTATION
The most obvious trend among armed groups has been fragmentation. While there have not been similar mapping exercises in 
the past, according to Congolese and United Nations estimates, there were probably no more than twenty armed groups in the 
Kivus in January 2008.1  
As other scholars have argued2 , several factors have led to this proliferation of armed groups. First, the simple lack of alternatives, 
especially the failure or absence of sound demobilization programs, produced factionalization and generated security dilemmas at 
the very local level. Most armed groups had never been very cohesive, and over time the lack of military pressure, the ample space 
and resources at tKeir disposal, and tKe goYernmentȇs failure to o΍er tKeir members alternatiYe liYeliKoods led tKem to splinter 
into multiple groups. Most of the groups present today––certain Raia Mutomboki groups are an exception to this3 ––are factions 
of previous ones. 
These dynamics were compounded by political developments brought about, ironically, by the peace process. Both the Global and 
ΖnclusiYe $greement of , ZKicK usKered in a transitional goYernment, and a series of failed ''5 and arm\ integration e΍orts 
contributed to a fragmentation of the political arena, which was then reproduced among armed groups. Provincial and national 
parliaments were created, and political parties multiplied. Some of these leaders politicians resorted to armed groups as a means 
of intimidating their rivals and bolstering their reputations as strongmen as violence became as means of political leverage. This, 
in turn, led to an escalation of violence as politicians and local communities mobilized in response to each other––a sort of security 
dilemma compounded by a competition for political power and patronage.  
$t tKe same time, tKe peace process forged a large, fractious arm\ out of tKe former belligerents 7Ke goYernment used tKe )$5'& 
to dole out patronage, botK in order to coopt its armed riYals, as Zell as to reZard lo\alists and to Neep its large oɝcer corps 
occupied in the east of the country.5 $s a result, armed mobilization became a reYolYing door, as discontent arm\ oɝcers Zould 
defect in order to negotiate better positions, often supported by opportunistic politicians. These perverse incentives were a key 
factor in the proliferation of armed groups.6
This instrumentalization of violence, however, began to ebb after the 2011 elections. The government decided to stop negotiating 
wholesale with armed groups––groups would no longer be rewarded with positions and cash payouts. While the government 
Kas not been consistent ZitK tKis polic\ȂȂnegotiations ZitK tKe )53Ζ and tKe <aNutumba 0ai 0ai KaYe been e[ceptions, altKougK 
neitKer came full\ to fruitionȂȂit appears tKat tKis Nind of reYolYing door militar\ integration Kas subsided Ζt is possible, KoZeYer, 
that this policy, while necessary, may have further fragmentation, as armed group leaders lose their authority as negotiators with 
the central government. 
)inall\, tKe persistence of local conȵict Kas proYided fertile ground for armed groups to mobilize 7Kese conȵicts, often driYen b\ 
struggles over customary succession or land, have often been politicized and seized upon by political elites in the region.  struggles 
over customary succession or land, have often been politicized and seized upon by political elites in the region.7
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THE RISE OF THE MILITARY APPROACH
:Kile it is encouraging to see an end to .insKasaȇs incessant negotiations8 with armed groups, the result has been a single-
mindedl\ militar\ approacK to tKe conȵict, botK b\ tKe &ongolese goYernment and tKe 81 peaceNeeping mission 'espite tZo 
rounds of a stabilization program, the government and its foreign partners have been unable to create a virtuous cycle of economic 
deYelopment in tKe rural .iYus tKat could entice local leaders to inYest in stabilit\ ratKer tKan conȵict  At the same time, the 
goYernment Kas been sloZ to Kold its arm\ oɝcers inYolYed in racNeteering and tKe support of armed groups accountable, and 
had dragged its feet in implementing its new demobilization plan.   
$s a result, tKe .iYus are left ZitK a militar\ strateg\ tKat lacNs mucK of a complementar\ diplomatic or peacebuilding e΍ort 
ANNEX: METHODOLOGICAL NOTES
Mapping non-state armed groups is, like many other illicit phenomena,10  a sensitive task and will inevitably involve imprecisions, 
especiall\ since neZ armed groups pop up eYer\ montK, and tKeir deplo\ments are in constant ȵu[ 7Ke aim Kere is inform a 
conYersation about tKe comple[it\ of tKe conȵict and armed group actiYit\ in tKe eastern &ongo :e Zelcome comments and 
criticism indeed, tKis Zill Kelp us improYe tKe ne[t, updated Yersion 
7Kis map is tKe result of e[tensiYe ȴeldZorN conducted b\ a netZorN of researcKers based in 8Yira, %uNaYu, *oma, and %utembo, 
and Kas beneȴted from seYeral rounds of internal and e[ternal reYieZs b\ e[perts on conȵict d\namics in tKis region 
A few additional comments:
ȏ 7Kis map is limited to 1ortK and 6outK .iYu
ȏ :e map Ȇzones of inȵuenceȇ ratKer tKan absolute control :Kile some armed groups e[ert e΍ectiYe control oYer an area,
otKers ma\ be able to e[ert substantial inȵuence oYer larger zones but lacN full control oYer tKose areas %\ zones of inȵuence,
Ze include botK Ninds of inȵuence +ence tKe size of an armed group area does not necessaril\ correspond to its strengtK
ȏ 7Ke conȵict in tKe .iYus is d\namic and an\ sucK mapping is TuicNl\ outdated 7Kis map represents tKe situation in 2ctober

ȏ :e cannot account for certain armed actors $ll groups included in tKis mapping KaYe tKe folloZing Tualities a selfperception
as armed group, an identiȴable leadersKip and appro[imate structure, and tKe e[istence of combatants and arms :Kile
banditr\ is increasing in certain parts of tKe .iYuȂȂmost notabl\ around %eni and betZeen /ubero and 5utsKuru territoriesȂȂ
we do not consider these actors as armed groups. Nonetheless, we have included actors ranging from micro-militias with no
more tKan  to  combatants to largescale, sopKisticated groups sucK as tKe )'/5
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